Family Affair — Part III — Private Monopsony, Monopoly, and the Disaccumulation of Capital

It’s always good to be ahead of the power curve.  I see that the eminent Paul Krugman had an editorial in the New York Times about the very issues that I’ve dealt with in this blog, his example in this case being Amazon.  This is just one of many articles that have been raised about the monopsony power as a result of the Hatchette controversy.  In The New Republic Franklin Foer also addresses this issue at length in the article “Amazon Must Be Stopped.”  In my last post on this topic I discussed public monopsony, an area in which I have a great deal of expertise.  But those of us in the information world that are not Microsoft, Oracle, Google, or one of the other giants also live in the world of private monopsony.

For those or you late to these musings (or skipped the last ones), this line of inquiry when my colleague Mark Phillips made the statement at a recent conference that, while economic prospects for the average citizen are bad, that the best system that can be devised is one based on free market competition, misquoting Churchill.  The underlying premise of the statement, of course, is that this is the system that we currently inhabit, and that it is the most efficient way to distribute resources.  There also is usually an ideological component involved regarding some variation of free market fundamentalism and the concept that the free market is somehow separate from and superior to the government issuing the currency under which the system operates.

My counter to the assertions found in that compound statement is to prove that the economic system that we inhabit is not a perfectly competitive one, that there are large swaths of the market that are dysfunctional and that have given rise to monopoly, oligopoly, and monopsony power.  In addition, the ideological belief–which is very recent–that the roots of private economic activity is one that had arisen almost spontaneously with government being a separate component that can only be an imposition, is also false, given that nation-states and unions of nation states (as in the case of the European Union) are the issuers of sovereign currency, and so choose through their institutions the amount of freedom, regulation, and competition that their economies foster.  Thus, the economic system that we inhabit is the result of political action and public policy.

The effects of the distortions of monopoly and oligopoly power in the so-called private sector is all around us.  But when one peels back the onion we can see clearly the interrelationships between the private and public sectors.

For example, patent monopolies in the pharmaceutical industry allow for prices to be set, not based on the marginal value of the drug that would be set by a competitive market, but based on the impulse for profit maximization.  A recent example in the press lately–and critiqued by economist Dean Baker–has concerned the hepatitis-C drug Sovaldi, which goes for $84,000 a treatment, compared to markets in which the drug has not been granted a patent monopoly, where the price is about $900 a treatment.  Monopoly power, in the words of Baker, impose 10,000 percent tariff on those who must live under that system.  This was one of the defects in a system that I wrote about in my blog posts regarding tournaments and games of failure, though in pharmaceuticals the comparison seems to be more in line with gambling and lotteries.  The financial risks of investors, who often provide funds based on the slimmest thread of a good idea and talent, are willing to put great sums of money at risk in order to strike it rich and realize many times their initial investment.  The distorting incentives on this system are well documented: companies tend to focus on those medications and drugs with the greatest potential financial rate of return guaranteed by the patent monopoly system*, drug trials that downplay the risks and side-effects of the medications, and the price of medications is placed at so high a level as to eliminate them from all but the richest members of society since few private drug insurance plans will authorize such treatments given the cost–at least not without a Herculean effort on the part of individual patients.

We can also see the monopoly power at work first hand with the present lawsuits between Apple and Samsung regarding the smartphone market.  For many years (until very recently) the U.S. patent office took a permissive stand in allowing technology firms to essentially patent the look and feel of a technology, as well as features that could be developed and delivered by any number of means.  The legal system, probably more technologically challenged than other areas of society, has been inconsistent in determining how to deal with these claims.  The fact finder in many cases has been juries, who are not familiar with the nuances of the technology.  One need not make a stretch to pick out practical analogies of these decisions.  If applied to automobiles, for example, the many cases that have enforced these patent monopolies would have restricted windshield wipers to the first company that delivered the feature.  Oil filters, fuel filters, fuel injection, etc. would all have been restricted to one maker.

The stakes are high not only for these two giant technology companies but also for consumers.  They have already used their respective monopoly power established by their sovereign governments to pretty effectively ensure that the barriers to entry in the smartphone market are quite high.  Now they are unleashing these same forces on one another.  In the end, the manufacturing costs of the iPhone 6–which is produced by slave labor under the capitalist variant of Leninist China–are certainly much lower than the $500 and more that they demand (along with the anti-competitive practice of requiring a cellular agreement with one of their approved partners).  The tariff that consumers pay for the actual cost of production and maintenance on smartphones is significant.  This is not remedied by the oft-heard response to “simply not buy a smartphone,” since it shifts responsibility for the establishment of the public policy that allows this practice to flourish, to individuals who are comparatively powerless against the organized power of lobbyists who influenced public representatives to make these laws and institute the policy.

The fight over IP and patent (as well as net neutrality) are important for the future of technological innovation.  Given the monopsony power of companies that also exert monopoly power in particular industries, manufacturers are at risk of being squeezed in cases where prices are artificially reduced through the asymmetrical relationship between large buyers and relatively small sellers.  Central planning, regardless of whether it is exerted by a government or a large corporation, is dysfunctional.  When those same corporations seek to not only exert monopoly and monopsony power, but also to control information and technology, they seek to control all aspects of an economic activity not unlike the trusts of the time of the Robber Barons.  Amazon and Walmart are but two of the poster children of this situation.

The saving grace of late has been technological “disruption,” but this term has been misused to also apply to rent-seeking behavior.  I am not referring only to the kind of public policy rent-seeking that Amazon achieves when it avoids paying local taxes that apply to its competitors, or that Walmart achieves when it shifts its substandard pay and abusive employee policies to local, state, and federal public assistance agencies.  I am also referring to the latest controversies regarding AirBnB, Lyft, and Uber, which use loopholes in dealing with technology to sidestep health and safety laws in order to gain entry into a market.

Technological disruption, instead, is a specific phenomenon, based on the principle that the organic barriers to entry in a market are significantly reduced due to the introduction of technology.  The issue over the control of and access to information and innovation is specifically targeted at this phenomenon.  Large companies aggressively work to keep out new entries and to hinder innovations except those that they can control, conspiring against the public good.

The reason for why these battles are lining up resides in the modern phenomena known as disaccumulation of capital, which was first identified by social scientist Martin J. Sklar.  What this means is that the accumulation of capital, which is the time it takes to reproduce the existing material conditions of civilization, began declining in the 1920s.  As James Livingston points out in the same linked article in The Nation, “economic growth no longer required net additions either to the capital stock or the labor force….for the first time in history, human beings could increase the output of goods without increasing the essential inputs of capital and labor—they were released from the iron grip of economic necessity.”

For most of the history of civilization, the initial struggle of economics has been the ability for social organization to provide sufficient food, clothing, shelter, and medical care to people.  The conflicts between competing systems has been centered on their ability to most efficiently achieve these purposes without sacrificing individual liberty, autonomy, and dignity.  The technical solution for these goals has largely been achieved, but the efficient distribution of these essential elements of human existence has not been solved.  With the introduction of more efficient methods of information processing as well as production (digital printing is just the start), we are at the point where the process of less capital in the aggregate being required to produce the necessities and other artifacts of civilization is accelerating exponentially.

Concepts like full employment will increasingly become meaningless, because the same relationship of labor input to production that we came to expect in the recent past has changed within our own lifetimes.  Very small companies, particularly in technology, can have and have had a large impact.  In more than one market, even technology companies are re-learning the lesson of the “mythical man-month.”  Thus, the challenge in our time is to rethink the choices we have made and are making in terms of incentives and distribution that maximizes human flourishing.  But I will leave that larger question to another blog post.

For the purposes of this post focused on technology and project management, these developments call for a new microeconomics.  The seminal paper that identified this need early on was by Brad DeLong and Michael Froomkin in 1997 entitled “The Next Economy.”  While some of the real life examples they give from our perspective today provides a stroll down the digital memory-lane,  their main conclusions are relevant in how information differs from physical goods.  These are:

a.  Information is non-rivalrous.  That is, one person consuming information does not preclude someone else from consuming that information.  That is, information that is produced can be economically reproduced to operate in other environments at little to no marginal cost.  What they are talking about here is application software and the labor involved in producing a version of it.

b.  Information without exterior barriers is non-exclusive.  That is, if information is known it is almost impossible for others to know it.  For example, Einstein was the first to observe the mathematics of relativity but now every undergraduate physics student is expected to fully understand the theory.

c.  Information is not transparent.  That is, oftentimes in order to determine whether a piece of software will achieve its intended purpose, effort and resources must be invested to learn it and, oftentimes, apply it if initially only in a pilot program.

The attack coming from monopsony power is directed at the first characteristic of information.  The attack coming from monopoly power is currently directed at the second.    Doing so undermines both competition and innovation.  The first by denying the ability of small technology companies to capitalize sufficiently to develop the infrastructure necessary to become sustainable.  Oftentimes this reduces a market to one dominant supplier.  The second by restricting the application of new technologies and lessons learned based on the past.  The nature of information asymmetry is a problem for the third aspect of information, since oftentimes bad actors are economically rewarded at the expense of high quality performers as first identified in the automobile industry in George Akerlof’s paper “The Market for Lemons” (paywall).

The strategy of some entrepreneurs in small companies in reaction to these pressures has been to either sell out and be absorbed by the giants, or to sell out to private equity firms that “add value” by combining companies in lieu of organic growth, loading them down with debt from non-sustainable structuring, and selling off the new entity or its parts.  The track record for the sustainability of the applications involved in these transactions (and the satisfaction of customers) is a poor one.

One of the few places where competition still survives is among small to medium sized technology companies.  In order for these companies (and the project managers in them) to survive independently requires not only an understanding of the principles elucidated by DeLong and Froomkin.  Information also shares several tendencies with other technological innovation, but in ways that are unique to it, in improving efficiency and productivity; and in reducing the input of labor and capital.

The key is in understanding how to articulate value, how to identify opportunities for disruption, and to understand the nature of the markets in which one operates.  One’s behavior will be different if the market is diverse and vibrant, with many prospective buyers and diverse needs, as opposed to one dominated by one or a few buyers.  In the end it comes down to understanding the pain of the customer and having the agility and flexibility to solve that pain in areas where larger companies are weak or complacent.

 

*Where is that Ebola vaccine–which mainly would have benefited the citizens of poor African countries and our own members of the health services and armed forces–that would have averted public panic today?

Family Affair — Part I — Managerial Economics of Projects, Microeconomic Foundations, and Macro

A little more than a week ago I had an interesting conversation on a number of topics with colleagues in attending the National Defense Industrial Association Integrated Program Management Division (NDIA IPMD).  A continuation of one of those discussions ended up in the comments section of my post “Mo’Better Risk–Tournaments and Games of Failure Part II” by Mark Phillips.  I think it is worthwhile to read Mark’s comments because within them lie the crux of the discussion that is going on not only in our own community, but in the country as a whole, particularly in the economics profession, that will eventually influence and become public policy.*

The intent of my posts on tournaments and games of failure consisted of outlining a unique market variation (tournaments) and the high cost of failure (and entry), that results from this type of distortion.  I don’t want to misinterpret his remarks but he seems to agree with me on the critique but can’t think of an alternative, emphasizing that competitive markets seem to be the best system that we have come up with.  About this same time a good friend and colleague of mine spent much energy bemoaning the $17 trillion debt in light of the relatively small amounts of money that we seek to save in managing projects.  Both contentions fail on common logical fallacies, but I don’t want to end the conversation there, because I understand that they are speaking in shorthand in lieu of a formal syllogism.  Their remarks are worthy of further thought and elaboration, especially since they are held by a good many people who come from scientific, mathematical, engineering, and technical backgrounds.

I will take the last one first, which concerns macroeconomics, because you can’t understand micro without knowing and understanding the environment in which you operate.  Much of this understanding is mixed in with ideology, propaganda, and wishful thinking.  Bill Gross at Pimco is just the latest example of someone who decided to listen to the polemicists at CNBC and elsewhere–and put his investors’ money where his mouth was.  You have to admit this about the lords of finance–what they lack in knowledge they make up for in bluster, especially when handing out bad advice.

Along these lines, a lot of energy gets expended about federal debt.  There have been cases–which are unique and well studied where countries can hold too much debt, especially if their economic fundamentals show significant weakness, but a little common sense places things in perspective.  Of the $17 trillion in debt, a little over $12 trillion is held by the public in the form of bonds and $5+ trillion held by other government agencies, particularly the trust funds for things like Social Security.  The bonds are exactly the same: assets for an investment portfolio and assets for any other institution that holds them.  U.S. treasury bills are very safe investments and so are traded worldwide, even by other countries.  Some of this is often spun as a negative but given that the U.S. dollar and U.S. securities are deemed safe, it turns out that–short of us doing something stupid like defaulting on our obligations–the U.S. is a stabilizing force in the world economy.

So $12 trillion in debt held by the public is about 74% of Gross Domestic Product, that is, the value of goods produced in the United States in any given year.  This is about the same level that the debt stood relative to GDP around 1950.  In 2007 it stood at about 37% of GDP but we had this thing called the Great Recession (though for those of us who run a business we couldn’t quite tell the difference between it and a depression).  Regardless, the country didn’t go bankrupt in 1950 (or in the 1940s when the pubicly-held debt to GDP ratio was over 100%).  Great Britain didn’t go bankrupt during its period of hegemony with debt to GDP ratios much higher.  When making the comparison of government finances to households, folks like those at the Peterson-funded and Washington Post Fix the Debt crowd speak like Victorian moralists about how no responsible household would have garnered such debt.  Well, household debt in 2014 stands at $11.63 trillion.  Average credit card debt is about $15K and average mortgage debt is $153,500.  Then there are other types of debt, such as student loans, on top of that which averages about $35K per household.  Given that median U.S. household income is a little over $51K, the debt to income ratio of households is 400% of annual income.  Given that comparison our national finances are anything but profligate.** One could make a very good case that we are underinvesting in capital improvements that would contribute to greater economic growth and opportunity down the line.

But there is a good reason for the spike in national debt that we saw beginning in 2008.  In case you missed it, the housing bubble burst in 2007.  This caused an entire unregulated field of securities to become virtually worthless overnight.  The banking and insurance assets that backed them lost a great deal of value, homeowners lost equity in their homes, investors lost value in their funds, the construction industry and its dependencies then tanked since part of a large part of the bubble consisted not only of overvalued real property but extremely high vacancy rates brought on by overbuilding, bank lending seized up, businesses found themselves without liquidity, seeing the carnage around them people who had jobs tightened their belts and the savings rate spiked, and those who lost jobs tapped into savings and retirement funds, which lost a large part of their values.  The total effect was that the economy took a nose dive.  In all about $8 trillion of wealth was wiped out almost overnight.  Yes, those Wall Street, banking, and real estate self-proclaimed geniuses reading their Drucker, Mankiw, and Chicago School books (when not leafing The Fountainhead for leisure) managed to use other peoples’ money and–not only lose a good part of it but managed to sink the world economy.  Millions of people were thrown out of work and businesses–many of which were household names–closed for good.  People not only lost their jobs but also their homes, through no direct fault or negligence of their own.  Most of those who found new jobs were forced to work for much less money.  Though the value of their homes (the asset) fell significantly, the obligations for that asset under their mortgages remained unchanged.  So much for shared moral hazard in real estate finance.

Economic stabilizers that have been in place for quite some time (unemployment insurance, Food stamps, etc.) came into play at the same time that collections from taxes fell precipitously, since fewer people were making money.  The combination of the social insurance stabilizers and President Obama’s combination of new spending and tax cuts to provide a jolt of temporary stimulus–despite polemicists to the contrary–was just enough to stop the fall but was not enough to quickly reverse it.  Even with the additional spending, the ratio of debt to GDP would not have been so marked if the economy had not lost so much value.  But that is the point of stabilizers and stimulus.  At that point it just doesn’t matter as long as what you do stops the death spiral.

A lot of energy then gets expended at this point about private vs. public expenditures, who received or deserved a bailout, etc.  Rick Santelli–also one of the geniuses at CNBC who has been consistently wrong about just about everything–had his famous rant about bailing out “losers” (after the bankers and investors got their money) without blushing.  This is because, I think, that people–even those well educated–have been convinced that political economy is a “soft” science where preferences are akin to belief systems along the lines of astrology, numerology, and other forms of magical thinking.  You pick your side; like skins vs. shirts.

This kind of thinking cannot be more wrong.  It is wrong not only because our scientific methods have come along pretty far, but also because the “ideological” thinking that has been sold in regard to political economy undermines the ability of citizens in a democratic republic to understand their role in it.  “A nation is great, and can only be as great, as its rank and file,” said historian and later president, Woodrow Wilson.  This proposition is as true today as it was a hundred years ago.  More urgently, it is wrong because after the world’s experience with disastrous semi-religious ideologies and cults of personality in the 20th century capped off by Radical Islam at the start of our own century, the last thing we need is more bigotry and stupidity that demands sacrifice and revolution, harming millions in the process, in the name of some far off, Utopian future or to regain some non-existent idealized past.

On the everyday level, it is important to end the magical thinking in this area because that is the only way for those of us who are not the masters of the universe–with a billion or so in the bank with politicians and media clowns willing to backstop our bad decisions–can survive.

Fallacy Number One: our economic structure is based on “private enterprise” with public action an imposition on that system

I begin refuting this fallacy with this image:

U.S. dollar

Notice that our currency is issued by a central bank.  This central bank is the Federal Reserve.  George Washington, our first President, is on the $1 bill.  Other dead presidents are on our other denominations.  On the front of the dollar bill it clearly states “The United States of America.”  That is because U.S. currency and the economy on which it is built is a construction of the U.S. government.  The rules that govern market behavior are established within guidelines prescribed by the government of the United States or the various states.  The People of the United States, as in “We the People of the United States…” that begins the Preamble to the Constitution, establish the currency and good faith and credit of the country.  J.P. Morgan Chase, Bill Gates, the Koch brothers, Bitcoin, and every other participant in the economy are subject to the will of the sovereign–in this case the People of the United States–that establishes this currency.

This is important to know when talking about such things like the debt.  For example, once the economy is back to growing at trend, should we still consider the debt level too high, we can marginally raise taxes to balance the budget and even pay down the debt like we were doing just 13 years ago.  It is also important because it allows us to use our critical thinking skills even though we may not be professional economists when faced by specious claims, like that of the debunked study by econmists Reinhart and Rogoff that purportedly showed a link to economic stagnation when countries exceeded 90% debt to GDP ratio.  For example, since the Federal Reserve is the central bank, should we find that there is a magic point at which we are concerned about debt as a percent of GDP, the Fed can buy its own bonds back at low prices that it previous sold at higher prices, thereby reducing the debt to GDP ratio simply by swapping paper.  Of course this would be ridiculous.  The important metric is understanding if we can make the annual payments and the percent of interest against GDP.

Understanding this essential nature of the economy in which we operate, combined with our critical thinking skills, can also inform us regarding why the Fed bought securities to provide cash to the economy–what is known as quantitative easing (QE).  Paul Krugman, the Nobel economist and New York Times columnist, has also posted some useful slides here.  This was done in several stages by the Federal Reserve because the economy was in what is called a liquidity trap with short term interest rates near zero.  Thus, there were not enough liquid assets (cash), to keep businesses and banking going.  The housing market and other businesses dependent on liquidity and low interest rates were also deeply depressed.  In project management, start-up costs must oftentimes be financed.  Businesses don’t have a vault of money sitting around just in case they get that big contract.  The bank of last resort–the Fed–used its authority to buy up existing bonds to prime the pump.  Rather than some unheard of government intervention in the “private” economy, the Fed did its job.

As to political economy, Thomas Paine, the publicist of the American Revolution, put it best in Agrarian Justice, and the common sense that he expressed over two hundred years ago is still true today:  “Personal property is the effect of society; and it is as impossible for an individual to acquire personal property without the aid of society, as it is for him to make land originally…Separate an individual from society, and give him an island or a continent to possess, and he cannot acquire personal property. He cannot be rich.”  Private property in the definition of Paine and Adam Smith, who was a contemporary, is defined as real property or the means of production, not private possessions.  We are long past the agrarian economies observed by Paine and Smith, where wealth was defined by land holdings.  But Smith did observe in one mention in The Wealth of Nations that the systems he observed–those markets that existed in his day–acted as if controlled by an “invisible hand.”  Much cult-like malarkey has been made of this line but what he was describing is what we now know of as systems theory or systems engineering.

Given this understanding, one can then make two essential observations.

First, that our problems where bogeyman numbers are used ($17 trillion!) aren’t so scary when one considers that we are a very large and very rich country.  We can handle this without going off the rails.  Is there a point where annual deficits are “bad” from a systems perspective?  Yes, and we can measure these effects and establish models to inform our decision making.  Wow–this sounds a lot like project management but on a national scale, with lawyers, lobbyists, and politicians involved to muck things up and muddy the waters.

The other observation is that we can also see how government policy was responsible for the manner in which it exposed its manufacturing workers to foreign competition, undercutting the power of domestic unions, not some natural order dictated by “globalization.”  It demonstrates how the shrinking of the middle class since 1980 was also the result of government action, and how the slow recovery, with its lack of emphasis on either job creation or wage protection, was also the result of government action.

Those who throw up their hands and say that there is nothing to be done because the rich always find a way to avoid responsibility and accountability not only are wrong from an historical and legal perspective, they also commit the sin of an act of omission, which is unforgivable.  That is, when you let something bad happen due to cynicism, indecisiveness, or apathy.

This then leads us to Fallacy Number Two:  Capitalism Is Necessarily Complimentary to Competition and Democracy

Mark Phillips’ on-line comment paraphrased Churchill’s observation that our system is one that, while imperfect, is the best we’ve found.  But Churchill was not speaking of free market fundamentalism or our current version of capitalism.  The actual quote is: “Democracy is the worst form of government, except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”  (Churchill, House of Commons, November 11, 1947).  It is hard to believe today that the conflict in Western thought before the Second World War, and the topic on which Churchill was reflecting, was not between Democracy and Totalitarianism and its ilk.  For most Europeans, as documented extensively in Tony Judt’s magisterial work Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (2005), the choice was seen as being between Fascism and Communism, liberal democracy being viewed as largely ineffective.

Furthermore, the democracy to which Churchill was referring in both the United States and the United Kingdom at the time, was much more closely organized around social democracy, where the economic system is subject to the goals of democratic principles.  This was apart from the differences in the types of democracy each was organized:  the U.S. on a constitutional, representative bicameral legislature, and presidential system of checks and balances; and the U.K. on a parliamentary, constitutional monarchy.  The challenge in 1947 was rebuilding the Western European countries, and those on the Asian periphery, to be self-sustaining and independent based on democratic principles and republican virtues as a counter to Soviet (and later Chinese) domination.  The discussion–and choice–had thus shifted from systems that assumed that people were largely economic actors where the economic system dictated the terms of the political system, to one that where a political system based on natural rights and self-government dictated the terms of the economic system.

Mark comments that competition is the best system that we have found in terms of economics, and I don’t necessary disagree.  But my level of agreement or disagreement depends on how we define competition and where we find it, whether it approximates what we call capitalism, and how that squares against democratic processes and republican institutions.

For example, the statement as it is usually posited also assumes that the “market picks winners” in some sort of natural selection.  Aside from committing the logical fallacy of the appeal to nature, it is also a misunderstanding of the nature of markets, how they work, and what they do.  As a government contract negotiator, contracting officer, and specialist for a good part of my career, understanding markets is the basis of acquisition strategy.

Markets set prices and, sometimes, they can also reflect consumer preferences.  In cases where competition works effectively, prices are driven to a level that promotes efficiency and the drive for newer products that, consequently, produce lower prices or greater value to the consumer.  Thus, competition, where it exists, provides the greatest value to the greatest number of people.  But we know this is not always the case in practice.  Also, just to be clear, what markets do not do is naturally elect someone, reward merit, define “makers” or “takers,” nor select the best ideas or the most valid ones.  It often doesn’t even select the best product among a field of competitors.  Markets focus on price and value, and they don’t even do that perfectly.

The reason for this is because there are no perfect markets.  Under classical economics it is assumed that the consumer has all of the information he or she needs in order to make a rational decision and that no supplier or buyer can dictate the terms of the market.  But no one has complete information.  Most often they don’t even have sufficient information to make a completely rational selection.  This was von Hayek’s insight in his argument against central planning before we discovered its tangible evils under both Soviet and Chinese communism.  This same insight speaks against monopoly and domination of a market by private entities.  This is called information economics.

Given that there is no such thing as a perfectly competitive market (since we do not live in a universe that allows for perfection), information economics has documented that the relationship among the independent players in a market is asymmetrical.  Some people have more information than others and will try to deny that information to others.  Technology is changing the fundamentals of information economics.

Compounding reality is that there are also different levels of competition that define the various markets, depending on vertical, product, industry, niche, etc. in the United States.  Some approximate competitive environments, some are monopolistic and others oligopolistic.  There can also be monopolistic competition among a few large firms.  Markets where competition is deemed destructive to the public interest (predatory competition) or is a result of a limited market for public goods (monopsony) are usually highly regulated.  How these markets develop is documented in systems theory.  For example, many markets start out competitive but a single market actor or limited set of actors are able to drive out competitors and then use their market power to dictate terms.  Since we operate in a political economy, rent-seeking behavior (seeking government protection through patent, intellectual property, copyright, and other monopolies as well as subsidies) is common and is probably one of the most corrupting influences in our political system today.

Thus, there is a natural conflict between our democratic principles and an economic system, which is established by the political system, that is based on economic rewards meted out in a hierarchical structure based on imperfect markets and rent-seeking.  This is why capitalism can morph itself and coexist in Leninist China and Autocratic Russia.  Given this natural conflict our institutions have passed laws that modify and regulate markets to make them behave in a manner that serves the public and ensures the positive benefits of competitive markets.  They have also passed laws that play into rent-seeking behavior and encourage wealth concentration.

A good example of both types of law and the conflict outlined above is the U.S. health care system and the Affordable Care Act (that I’ve previously written about), also known as Obamacare.  There are several aspects of the new law, and sections of the omnibus bill that passed under its rubric read almost as if they were separate laws with conflicting goals.

For example, the ACA, under which it is also known, established the healthcare exchanges on which plans could be purchased from private insurance providers.  This aspect of the law set up a competitive marketplace with information about each plan clearly provided to the consumer.  In addition, the ACA passed what had previously been known as the Patient’s Bill of Rights, which established minimal levels of service and outlawed some previously predatory and unethical practices.  This structure is the real world analogue of a competitive market that is regulated to outlaw abusive practices.

At the same time other portions of the bill prohibited the federal government from using its purchasing power to get the best price for prescription drugs, and also prohibited competition from Canadian drugs.  This is the analogue of rent-seeking.  When combined with laws that establish drug patent monopolies which allow companies to keep prices 300 to 400 percent above marginal cost, it is no wonder why per capita expenditures on healthcare are almost twice any other developed nation, though the cost seems to be coming down as a result of the competitive market reforms from the healthcare exchanges.

Revisiting our discussion earlier on debt, were our healthcare expenditures in line with other developed countries, we would be seeing budget surpluses well into the future.  The main driver of deficits is largely centered in Medicare.  Aside from cost cutting, other methods would be to expand, instead of shrinking, the pool of middle class workers which make up the broadest and largest source of revenue, with wages and salaries at least keeping pace with productivity gains.

In sum, competition is a useful tool and delegation of economic decisions is largely in line with our republican virtues.  But, I think, it is clear that there are hideous market distortions and imperfections that, in the end, undermine competition.  Many of these distortions and imperfections come about from competitive markets, which are then undermined once a market entity has gained control or undue influence.  Systems theory inform us about how markets behave and how we can regulate them to maximize the benefits of competition.

But the obscene fortunes that are held by a very small percentage of individuals–and the power that attends to them–represents in very real terms a danger to the institutions that we value.  So whether we can think of a better system is not the issue, taking incremental steps to reestablish republican virtues and democratic values is imperative.

Fallacy Number Three:  Microfoundations Determine Macro

Given the multiplicity of markets–and the mathematics and modeling that attend systems theory–it is clear that aggregation of microeconomic dynamics will not explain macroeconomic behavior–at least not as it is presently understood and accepted by the academic field.  Economics is a field that need not be “soft,” but which failed miserably to anticipate the housing bubble and resulting bursting of that bubble, and the blind alleys that some economists advocated that misled policy makers in the wake of the crisis exacerbated human suffering.  Europe is still under the thumb of German self-interest and an “expansionary austerity” ideology that resists empirical evidence.  Apparently 20% unemployment is just the corrective that peripheral countries need despite Germany’s own experience of the consequences of such policies in the 1930s–and extremist parties are rising across Europe as a result.

As a complex adaptive system, macroeconomic policies changes the behavior, structure, and terms of a market.  For example, ignoring antitrust legislation and goals to allow airlines and cable companies to consolidate encourages rent-seeking.  “Deregulating” such industries establish oligopolistic and monopolistic markets.  These markets dictate the behavior of the entities that operate in it, not the opposite way around.  The closed-loop behavior of this system then becomes apparent: successful rent-seeking encourages additional rent-seeking.  The consumer is nowhere in sight in this scenario.

Thus, we can trace the macro behavior of each system and then summarize them to understand the economy as a whole.  But this is a far cry from basing these systems on the behavior and planning of the individual entities at the microeconomic level.  Our insights from physics and tracing other complex systems, including climate, inform our ability to see that macro behavior can be summarized given the right set of variables, traced at the proper level of detail.

This then leads us to the fundamentals of the Managerial Economics of Projects, which I will summarize in my next post.

 

*I usually try to steer from these types of posts, especially since those that skirt politics and polemics tend to be contentious, but the topic is too important in understanding the area of managerial economics that involves projects and systems dynamics.  A blog, after all, is a public discussion, not a submission of an academic paper.  For those unfamiliar, my educational background is based in political science, economics, and business (undergraduate work and degree), and my graduate work and degrees focused on world and American history, business, and organizational behavior.  This is apart from my professional and other activities in software engineering, systems engineering, project management, group psychology, and the sciences, including marine biology.

**So the reader will not be scared of the big number for household income to debt ratios, keep in mind that the largest of these liabilities (and assets) is long-term.  For most mortgages this is 30 years.

My Generation — Baby Boom Economics, Demographics, and Technological Stagnation

“You promised me Mars colonies, instead I got Facebook.” — MIT Technology Review cover over photo of Buzz Aldrin

“As a boy I was promised flying cars, instead I got 140 characters.”  — attributed to Marc Maron and others

I have been in a series of meetings over the last couple of weeks with colleagues describing the state of the technology industry and the markets it serves.  What seems to be a generally held view is that both the industry and the markets for software and technology are experiencing a hardening of the arteries and a resistance to change not seen since the first waves of digitization in the 1980s.

It is not as if this observation has not been noted by others.  Tyler Cowen at George Mason University noted the trend of technological stagnation in the eBook The Great Stagnation: How America Ate All the Low-Hanging Fruit of Modern History, Got Sick, and Will(Eventually) Feel BetterCowen’s thesis is not only to point out that innovation has slowed since the late 19th century, but that it has slowed a lot, where we have been slow to exploit “low-hanging fruit.”  I have to say that I am not entirely convinced by some of the data, which is anything but reliable in demonstrating causation in the long term trends.  Still, his observations of technological stagnation seem to be on the mark.  His concern, of course, is also directed to technology’s affect on employment, pointing out that, while making some individuals very rich, the effect of recent technological innovation doesn’t result in much employment

Cowen published his work in 2011, when the country was still in the early grip of the slow recovery from the Great Recession, and many seized on Cowen’s thesis as an opportunity for excuse-mongering and looking for deeper causes than the most obvious ones: government shutdowns, wage freezes, reductions in government R&D that is essential to private sector risk handling, and an austerian fiscal policy (with sequestration) in the face of weak demand created by the loss of $8 trillion in housing wealth that translated into a consumption gap of $1.2 trillion in 2014 dollars

Among the excuses that were manufactured is the meme that is still making the rounds about jobs mismatch due to a skills gap.  But, as economist Dean Baker has pointed out again and again, basic economics dictates that the scarcity of a skill manifests itself in higher wages and salaries–a reality not supported by the data for any major job categories.  Unemployment stood at 4.4 percent in May 2007 prior to the Great Recession.  The previous low between recession and expansion was the 3.9 percent rate in December 2000, yet we are to believe that suddenly in the 4 years since the start of one of the largest bubble crashes and resulting economic and financial crisis, that people no longer have the skills need to be employed (or suddenly are more lazy or shiftless).  The data do not cohere.

In my own industry and specialty there are niches for skills that are hard to come by and these people are paid handsomely, but the pressure among government contracting officers across the board has been to drive salaries down–a general trend seen across the country and pushed by a small economic elite and therein, I think lies the answer more than some long-term trend tying patents to “innovation.”  The effect of this downward push is to deny the federal government–the people’s government–from being able to access the high skills personnel needed to make it both more effective and responsive.  Combined with austerity policies there is a race to the bottom in terms of both skills and compensation.

What we are viewing, I think, that is behind our current technological stagnation is a reaction to the hits in housing wealth, in real wealth and savings, in employment, and in the downward pressure on compensation.  Absent active government fiscal policy as the backstop of last resort, there are no other places to make up for $1.2 trillion in lost consumption.  Combine this with the excesses of the patent and IP systems that create monopolies and stifle competition, particularly under the Copyright Term Extension Act and the recent Leahy-Smith America Invents Act.  Both of these acts have combined to undermine the position of small inventors and companies, encouraging the need for large budgets to anticipate patent and IP infringement litigation, and raising the barriers to entry for new technological improvements.

No doubt exacerbating this condition is the Baby Boom.  Since university economists don’t seem to mind horning in on my specialty (as noted in a recent post commenting on the unreliability of data mining by econometrics),  I don’t mind commenting on theirs–and what has always surprised me is how Baby Boom Economics never seems to play a role in understanding trends, nor as predictors of future developments in macroeconomic modeling.  Wages and salaries, even given Cowen’s low-hanging fruit, have not kept pace with productivity gains (which probably explains a lot of wealth concentration) since the late 1970s–a time that coincides with the Baby Boomers entering the workforce in droves.  A large part of this condition has been a direct consequence of government policies–through so-called ‘free trade” agreements–that have exposed U.S. workers in industrial and mid-level jobs to international competition from low-paying economies.

The Baby Boom, given an underperforming economy, saw not only their wages and salaries lag, but also saw their wealth and savings disappear with the Great Recession, when corporate mergers and acquisitions weren’t stealing their negotiated defined benefit plans, which they received in lieu of increases in compensation.  This has created a large contingent of surplus labor.  The size of the long-term unemployed, though falling, is still large compared to historical averages, is indicative of this condition.

With attempts to privatize Social Security and Medicare, workers now find themselves squeezed and under a great deal of economic anxiety.  On the ground I see this anxiety even at the senior executive level.  The workforce is increasingly getting older as people hang on for a few more years, perpetuating older ways of doing things. Even when there is a changeover, oftentimes the substitute manager did not receive the amount of mentoring and professional development expected in more functional times.  In both cases people are risk-averse, feeling that there is less room for error than there was in the past.

This does not an innovative economic environment make.

People who I had known as risk takers in their earlier years now favor the status quo and a quiet glide path to a secure post-employment life.  Politics and voting behavior also follows this culture of lowered expectations, which further perpetuates the race to the bottom.  In high tech this condition favors the perpetuation of older technologies, at least until economics dictates a change.

But it is in this last observation that there is hope for an answer, which does confirm that this is but a temporary condition.  For under the radar there are economies upon economies in computing power and the ability to handle larger amounts of data with exponential improvements in handling complexity.  Collaboration of small inventors and companies in developing synergy between compatible technologies can overcome the tyranny of the large monopolies, though the costs and risks are high.

As the established technologies continue to support the status quo–and postpone needed overhauls of code mostly written 10 to 20 years ago (which is equivalent to 20 to 40 software generations) their task, despite the immense amount of talent and money, is comparable to a Great Leap Forward–and those of you who are historically literate know how those efforts turned out.  Some will survive but there will be monumental–and surprising–falls from grace.

Thus the technology industry in many of its more sedentary niches are due for a great deal of disruption.  The key for small entrepreneurial companies and thought leaders is to be there before the tipping point.  But keep working the politics too.

APolitical DoD Budget Blues – Part II

The folks at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments are hyperventilating about the contradictions in the 2015 defense budget submitted by the Administration.  At the center of their concerns is that the budget was modified at the last minute to propose an Army and Marine Corps end strength of 440-450,000 and 182,000 respectively, and Navy carrier levels at 11.

Instead, the Pentagon decided to propose $115 billion above the budget caps for DoD to support modernization programs with force levels at 420,000 and 175,000 for the Army and Marine Corps, with Navy carriers falling to 10.  This is the tradeoff that I highlighted in my last post on the budget–between the costs of sustainment for an aging standing force to meet immediate contingencies versus longer term investment to maintain the technological edge.  What bothers CSBA is the last minute change, which would need at least another $20 billion to fully fund.

Secretary Hagel has not explained the contradiction but what could it be that would cause the Pentagon to adjust its tradeoff at the last minute with an asterisk?  One word in my mind: Ukraine.  Perhaps several, including Chinese designs against Japanese territory, among other world issues that could destabilize national interests and lead to regional war–or worse.

Total discretionary (non-social insurance) spending is $1.014 trillion in FY 2015.  Of this, DoD spending is proposed to be $495.6 billion–about half.  Another $20 billion would represent 2% of the total discretionary budget.  So, given that the bill needs to be run through Congressional committee and the budget process, is it really necessary to go back to the drawing board when the CSBA suggests that the budget as it stands is probably DOA?  I think not.

Overall, for R&D programs, spending is up 1.7% above the previous fiscal year.  This is not a windfall by any means, nor does it restore things to pre-sequester levels.  But we are living through a period in American history of pretend penury.  The U.S. can more than afford to fund those needs to mitigate the effects of the great recession AND spend sufficient funds to protect the interests of itself and its allies today and into the future.  Even taking the growth projections of the Congressional Budget Office into account at 3% per year (given the CBO has been consistently wrong about such projections for almost a decade now), plus inflation of 2%, U.S. deficits in the range of 3 to 4% are sustainable well into the future.  If incomes were to keep pace with productivity gains, and with modest adjustments to revenues during periods of growth when full employment returns, the U.S. could easily begin to run budget surpluses as it did in the late 1990s.  We are still a very rich country.

I am not entirely convinced that comparing budget deficits and debt to a percent of GDP actually means anything.  If the frequent comparison to a household budget were to be equivalent to the spending patterns of Americans, U.S. deficit spending would be well above 100% of GDP, given the average mortgage, personal, and credit card debt held by private individuals.  With the debunking of Reinhart and Rogoff this tie, I believe, is even less valid.  Even if it did matter and R&R had not been so thoroughly proven wrong, much of what we project as debt is held by the public.  As Dean Baker has proposed, if there is a magic percent of GDP lurking out there that will suddenly cause our deficits to be unsustainable, Treasury could simply reduce the percentage through bond purchases.

Thus it appears that, if the Administration’s budget is at least used as a baseline, that there is much hope here that the U.S. maintains its technological edge while it attempts to figure out how to handle the next immediate crisis.  The risk to project management during the hearing process is that $20 billion will be carved out of R&D, which would negate the gains in the Administration’s proposal.  Thus, going into 2015, project managers will still need to be vigilant to find opportunities to substitute newer and less expensive technologies for old ones, and to aggressively use methods such as cost as an independent variable (CAIV) where they can.  Carry-over may once again be vital.

I’ll have more analysis as details emerge and the process works out.